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We study the time series data of the racetrack betting market in the Japan Racing As-
sociation (JRA). As the number of votes t increases, the win bet fraction x(t) converges to
the final win bet fraction xf . We observe the power law (x(t)− xf )
2 ∝ t−β with β ≃ 0.488.
We measure the degree of the completeness of the ordering of the horses using an index
AR, the horses are ranked according to the size of the win bet fraction. AR(t) also obeys
the power law and behaves as ARf − AR(t) ∝ t
−γ with γ ≃ 0.589, where ARf is the final
value of AR. We introduce a simple voting model with two types of voters–independent and
herding. Independent voters provide information about the winning probability of the horses
and herding voters decide their votes based on the popularities of the horses. This model
can explain two power laws of the betting process. The component ratio of the independent
voter to the herding voter is 1:3.
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1. Introduction
Racetrack betting is a simple exercise of gaining a profit or losing one’s wager. However,
one needs to make a decision in the face of uncertainty, and a closer inspection of this decision-
making process reveals great complexity and scope. The field has attracted many academics
from various disciplines and has become a subject of wider importance.1) Compared to the
stock or currency exchange markets, racetrack betting is a short-lived and repeated market.
It is possible to obtain a clearer understanding of aggregated betting behaviour and study the
market efficiency. One of the main findings of the previous studies is the ‘favorite-longshot
bias’ in the racetrack betting market.2, 3) The final odds are, on average, accurate measures
of winning, short-odds horses are systematically undervalued, and long-odds horses are sys-
tematically overvalued.
From an econophysical perspective, racetrack betting is an interesting subject. Park and
Dommany have analysed the distribution of the final odds (dividends) of the races organised
by the Korean Racing Association.4) They observed that the distribution of the final odds
∗E-mail : mori@sci.kitasato-u.ac.jp
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exhibited the power law behaviour. They explained this behaviour on the basis of the assump-
tions of a rational better who maximizes the expected payoff and a multiplicative rule in the
estimate of the winning probability. Ichinomiya also observed the power law of final odds in
the races organised by the Japan Racing Association (JRA)5) and proposed another betting
model where the strength of the horse obeys uniform distribution and the complex competition
process in the horse race is described by normal distribution. He also assumed that betters
exhibit irrational behaviour and bet their money on the horse that appears to be strongest
in the race. The authors analysed the uncertainty in the prediction of the racetrack betting
market. It is a short-lived and repeated market, and hence the accuracy of the predictions
can be estimated. We found a scale-invariant relation between the rank of a racehorse and the
result of its victory or defeat in JRA.6) Horses are ranked according to the win bet fractions.
In the long-odds region, between the cumulative distribution function of the winning horses
x1 and that of the losing horses x0, a scale-invariant relation x1 ∝ x
α
0 with α = 1.81 holds. In
a betting model where betters display herd-like behaviour (herding better) with only a small
amount of information about the strength of the horses and vote on the horses according to
the probabilities that are proportional to the number of the votes, it is possible to show that
the scale invariance emerges in a self-organized fashion. The authors also studied another bet-
ting model with two types of voters–independent and herding.7) Independent voters provide
information about the winning probability of the horses to the market. It was found that a
phase transition occurs in the process of information aggregation and that herding voters are
responsible for the slow convergence of the win bet fraction.
Summarizing these studies, we are faced with two questions about the racetrack betting
market. The first question is whether the betters are rational or not. The final odds contain
an accurate estimate of the winning probability, which means that the betters look rational.
However, it is improbable that all betters are clever and are able to precisely estimate the
winning probability. In the exchange or stock market, the role of fundamental and chartist-
type participants has been discussed.9) The component ratios of the two types of participants
change drastically, and thus, the market exhibits a complex behavior. It was also discussed
that herding voters increase the accuracy of prediction in a forecasting game, and such herd-
ing behaviour may be very efficient in aggregating dispersed private information.10) In the
racetrack betting market, whether such types of participants exist is an interesting question.
The second question is the distribution of final odds, which reflects the winning probability
of a horse. Previous studies have proposed the two possibility of potential mechanisms. The
drawback of Park and Dommany’s model is that the true winning probability distribution
does not come from the betting or estimating process. It instead comes from the system in
which many horses run at the same time and try to get to the first position after complex
competition process. If the multiplicative estimation rule produces the empirical distribution
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of the winning probability, the model can represent the complex competition process. Betters
understand how to estimate the winning probability after studying many horse races; the
final odds reflect the true winning probability. Although Ichinomiya proposed an interesting
mechanism to observe power law in the final odds, his assumption of irrational betters cannot
be accepted. If betters are not rational, it is difficult to understand the efficiency of the market
where the win bet fraction coincides with the true winning probability. In this study, we focus
on the rationality of the betters. We study the time series data of the win bet in the JRA
and the nature of the betters, i.e., whether they are rational or not, and what type of better
exists in the racetrack betting market. With respect to the distribution of the final odds, we
only assume that the winning probability has a broad distribution and can be estimated on
the basis of the final odds.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In §2, we provide a detailed study of the
time series data of the win bet. We have studied the time series data of the win bet odds in
2008 of JRA. Horses are ranked according to the win bet fraction and the receiver operation
characteristic (ROC) curve is discussed. We measure the fluctuation of the win bet fraction
x and the degree of the completeness of the ordering of the horses by an index AR with
the progress of the voting. In §3, we show the result of the data analysis. As the number
of vote t increases, x(t) converges to the final values xf very slowly. The power law relation
(x(t) − xf )
2 ∝ t−β with β ≃ 0.488 holds. AR(t) also obeys a power law ARf − AR(t) ∝ t
−γ
with γ ≃ 0.589, where ARf is the final value of AR. In §4, we introduce a voting model, where
there are two types of voters–independent and herding. Using the exponent in the power law
convergence of x(t), we estimate the component ratio of the independent voter to the herding
voter is 1:3. The power law convergence of AR(t) is also observed in this voting model. Section
5 is dedicated to the summary.
2. Racetrack Betting Process
We study the win bet data of JRA races in 2008. A win bet is the wager that the better
lays on the winner of the race. Out of the 3542 in that year, we choose 2471 races whose
final public win pool (total number of votes) V r is in the range of 105 ≤ V r ≤ 3 × 105, r ∈
{1, 2, · · · , R = 2471}. The average value of V r is about 1.89 · 105. N r horses run in race r;
N r is in the range pf 7 ≤ N r ≤ 18. We ignore 102 canceled horses; the total number of
horses N ≡
∑R
r=1N
r is 35719. The number of the winning horse is 2472 (one tie occurs) and
is denoted as N1 = 2472. The number of the remaining horses (losing horses) is denoted as
N0 = N −N1. K
r denotes the number of times a public announcement was made regarding
the temporal odds and number of votes in race r.Kr is in the range of 13 ≤ Kr ≤ 217, and the
total number of announcements is K ≡
∑R
r=1K
r ≃ 2.0× 105. On an average, announcements
were made eighty times up till the start of the races. The time from the announcement to
the race entry time (start of the race) in minutes is denoted as T rk . We denote the temporal
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odds of the ith horse in race r at the kth announcement as Ori,k; the public win pool as V
r
k .
V rKr = V
r holds. Iri denotes the results of the races. I
r
i = 1(0) implies that horse i wins (loses)
in race r. A typical sample from the data is shown in Table I.
Table I. Time series of odds and pool for a race that starts at 13 : 00. N r = 10,Kr = 52. We show
the data only for the first three horses 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. The first horse wins the race (Ir
1
= 1, Ir
2
= Ir
3
=
· · · = 0).
k T rk [min] V
r
k O
r
1,k O
r
2,k O
r
3,k · · ·
1 358 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 · · ·
2 351 169 1.6 33.3 7.9 · · ·
3 343 314 1.8 11.3 8.0 · · ·
4 336 812 2.9 17.8 14.6 · · ·
5 329 1400 3.3 8.6 10.6 · · ·
6 322 1587 2.7 9.2 11.3 · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
51 10 80064 2.4 6.4 13.4 · · ·
52 4 148289 2.4 4.9 16.1 · · ·
53 -2 211653 2.4 5.3 17.0 · · ·
From Ori,k, we estimate the win bet fraction x
r
i,k by the following relation according to the
rule by JRA.
xri,k =
0.788
Ori,k − 0.1
. (1)
If the sum of the above values does not equal 1 in each announcement, we renormalize it as
xˆri,k =
xr
i,k
∑Nr
i=1 x
r
i,k
. Hereafter, we use xri,k in place of xˆ
r
i,k.
We use the public win pool averaged over all the races as the time variable t for the entire
betting process. For each 0 ≤ v ≤ 3× 105, we select the nearest V ri,k and use the average value
of V ri,k as the time variable t. More explicitly, we define t as
t(v) ≡
1
N
R∑
r=1
V rkr(v) ·N
r, (2)
kr(v) ≡ {k |Mink|V
r
k − v|}. (3)
The range of t is 70 ≤ t ≤ 1.89 × 105; the largest time is denoted as tf ≡ 1.89 × 10
5. At tf ,
the number of votes v becomes V r; tf represents the end of the voting process. If t exceeds
105, it cannot be accurately regarded as a time variable. As the public win pool V r is in the
range 105 −−3× 105, if t exceeds the V r of some races, then the voting ends for those races.
The results of the data analysis for t ≥ 105 does not provide true information about the time
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evolution of the voting process. The data for t ≥ 105 is provided only for the purpose of
reference. We also define xri (t) as
xri (t) ≡ x
r
i,kr(v). (4)
The average value of T rk is denoted as T (t) and defined as
T (t) ≡
1
N
R∑
r=1
T rkr(v) ·N
r. (5)
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Fig. 1. Relationship between T [min] and average number of votes t. In the first announcement (k =
1), which occurs approximately 10 h before the start of the race, the average number of votes t is
71.0. Approximately 30 min before the start of the races, about 4× 104 votes have been cast.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between T and t. A rapid growth is observed in the average
number of votes t as we approach the start of the race (T → 0). Almost half of the votes are
thrown in the last 9 min.
In order to provide a pictorial representation of the betting process pictorially, we arrange
the N horses in the order of the size of xri (t). We denote the arranged win bet fraction as
xα(t), α ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
x1(t) ≥ x2(t) ≥ x3(t) ≥ · · · ≥ xN (t) (6)
Iα(t) tells us whether horse α wins (Iα = 1) or loses (Iα = 0). In general, the probability
that the horse with a large xα(t) wins is big and vice versa. We arrange the horses in the
increasing order of α from left to right. The left-hand side of the sequence represents stronger
horses, and the right-hand side, the weaker horses. If the win bet fraction does not contain any
information about the strength of the horses, Iα(t) randomly assumes the value of one and
zro. Conversely, if the information is completely correct, the first N1 horses’ Iα(t) are 1 and
the remaining N0 horses’ Iα(t) are 0. In general, as t increases, the accuracy of xα(t) increases
and the strong horses with large winning probabilities move to the left and vice versa.
5/14
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Fig. 2. Pictorial representation of the movement of the ranking of the horses by betting process.
Three horses are winning and 5 horses are losing. As t increases, we move from the bottom row
to the top one. We depict the winning (losing) horses by white (black) circles. On the right, we
show the corresponding ROC curve.
Figure 2(left) shows the movement of the ranking of the horses due to voting. There are
eight horses; three of them are winning ones (white circle) and the remaining five are losing
ones (black circle). The initial configuration, which corresponds to the first announcement
k = 1 in each race, is shown in the bottom row. In terms of ranking, the 2nd, 4th, and 7th
horses are winning and the remaining horses are losing (I2 = I4 = I7 = 1, I1 = I3 = I5 = I6 =
I8 = 0). As t increases, the rank of the winning horses moves to the left in general and the
accuracy of the prediction by the betters is improved. At the final state, the 1st, 3rd, and 6th
horses are winning ones (I1 = I3 = I6 = 1, I2 = I4 = I5 = I7 = I8 = 0).
We employ the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve11) and observe the
movement of the ranking and the increase in the accuracy more pictorially. It is a
path {(x0,k, x1,k)}k=0,··· ,N in two-dimensional space (x0, x1) from (x0,0, x1,0) = (0, 0) to
(x0,N , x1,N ) = (1, 1) as
xµ,k =
1
Nµ
k∑
j=1
δIj ,µ. (7)
If Ik = µ, the path extends in xµ direction. If the winning and losing horses are sufficiently
mixed in the ranking space, the path almost runs diagonally to the end point. If the accuracy
of the prediction is good, they are separated and the path resembles an upward convex curve
from (0, 0) to (1, 1). Figure 2(right) shows the ROC curves corresponding to the ranking
configuration {Iα}α=1,··· ,N on the left. For the bottom case, the win bet fractions xα do not
contain sufficient information about the strength of the horses. The ROC curve is almost
6/14
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along the diagonal line. As the betting progresses from bottom to top, the phase separation
between the two categories of the horses does occur and ROC curves become more and more
upwardly convex.
We are able to discuss the discriminative power of the better on the basis of the probability
that the ranking of a randomly selected winning horse αw is higher than that of a randomly
selected losing one αl.
11) The normalized index called accuracy ratio AR is defined as
AR ≡ 2 · (Prob(αw < αl)−
1
2
). (8)
If the betters cannot make any discrmination, the horses are mixed randomly. Prob.(αw < αl)
becomes 12 and AR becomes zero. If the betters can make a strong ( or a completely accurate)
discrimination, both Prob.(αw > αl) and AR become 1. Prob.(αw < αl) is also the area below
the ROC curve, and AR can be estimated as
AR = 2 ·
(
N∑
k=1
x1,k · (x0,k − x0,k−1)−
1
2
)
. (9)
AR changes from 1/15 to 5/15 to 7/15 from the bottom row to the top row in Fig 2.
3. Power Law Convergence of xα(t) and AR(t)
In this section, we explain the results of the analysis of the time series. We start from the
convergence of the win bet fraction xα(t) to its final value xα,f , where xα,f is the final value
of the win bet fraction xα,f ≡ xα(tf ). xα,f is the winning probability of the horse α agreeded
by all the betters who vote in the race. It is the subjective probability or the risk neutral
probability of the victory of the horse. We cannot compute the true winning probability
(objective winning probability) of the horse. If several horses with almost the same value of
the win bet fraction xf are grouped together, the winning rate of the horses coincides with
the win bet fraction.1, 8) In this manner, the market is shown to be efficient and no one can
get surplus gain by knowing the value of xf .
We calculate the average value of the squared fluctuation over the horses as
[(xα(t)− xα,f )
2] ≡
1
N
N∑
α=1
(xα(t)− xα,f )
2. (10)
If the voting has been performed by voters independently, [(xα(t) − xα,f )
2] depends on t as
t−1; this is termed as normal diffusion. If the behaviour deviates from t−1 to t−β with β < 1,
the power law convergence is termed as super diffusive.12)
Figure 3 shows the double logarithmic plot of [(xα(t)−xα,f )
2] as a function of t. We observe
a slow convergence of xα(t) to xα,f and a power law behaviour as t
−β with β = 0.488± 0.007
for t ≤ tc ≃ 3 × 10
4. After tc, the convergence occurs rapidly. This sort of super diffusive
behaviour has been observed in many types of data such as coarse-grained DNA sequences,
written texts, and financial data. Figure 3 also shows the plot of ARf -AR(t) as a function
7/14
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Fig. 3. Double logarithmic plot of [(xα(t)−xα,f )
2] and ARf−AR(t) as functions of t. The fitted lines
with the power law function a · t−β are also plotted.
of t, where ARf is the final value of ARf ≡AR(tf ). The fitted curve ARf − a · t
−γ with
γ = 0.589± 0.005 and ARf = 0.6826 is also shown. We observe a slow convergence and power
law behaviour of AR(t). Contrary to the convergence of xα(t), the power law relation holds
for a wider range of t. We note that after t = 105, the voting ends in some races with V r < t;
in these case the plot does not reflect the true time evolution of the voting process.
4. Voting Model with Independent and Herding Voters
In this section, we introduce a voting model and explain the power law behaviours men-
tioned in the previous section. There are N r horses; this number varies among races. We
assume it to be a constant value, N r = N/R. Voters vote for the horses individually, and the
result of each voting is announced promptly. The time variable t ∈ {0, 1, 2 · · · , T} represents
the number of the votes. Among N r horses, we select a horse with winning probability w
and call it the target horse. The probability that any other horse wins is then 1 − w. Voters
somehow know the value w, and after many votes, the win bet fraction coincides with w. We
denote the number of votes of the target horse at time t as Xwt . At t = 0, X
w
t takes the initial
value Xw0 = s > 0. There are N
r horses in a race and the sum of Xwt is N
rs+ t. If the target
horse gets a vote at t, Xwt increases by one unit.
Xwt+1 = X
w
t + 1.
We introduce two types of voters–independent and herding. Independent voters their vote
on the basis of their private information and are not affected by the value of Xwt . These
8/14
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Fig. 4. Representation of a voting model. There are two types of voters–independent and herding.
The component rates are ri and rh. The target horse has the winning probability w and the
independent voters voting for it is also w. The herding voters decide their vote on the basis of the
popularity Xwt of the horse.
voters provide information about the strength of the horses. We assume that the ratio of the
independent voters who vote for the target horse with true winning probability w is w. If
there are only independent voters in the market, the win bet fraction xwt ≡
Xwt −s
t
converges
to the winning probability w according to the power law < (xwt − w)
2 >∼ 1/t. Here, < >
means the averagevalue over all possible paths of the stochastic voting process. The herding
voters decide their vote on the basis of the popularity of the horse and do not rely on private
information. A herding voter casts a vote for the target horse at a rate proportional to Xwt .
They do not bring in any information about the horses. They cause slow convergence of the
win bet fraction xwt to the final value w.
7)
Regarding the rationalities of the voters, we make the following two statements. The
herding voters are rational because they have no information about the strength of the horses,
and the best way for them is to get information from the results of previous votes. If a horse
get many votes, many voters agree that the horse is strong. Hence, the herding voters feel it
rational to cast a vote to the popular horse and their behaviour is also ratinal. Of course, the
total votes also include votes cast by herding voters who might provide wrong information.
If the ratio of independent voters who vote for a horse with winning probability w coincides
with w, the fluctuation induced by the herding voters is cancelled after the votes have been
cast many times.
9/14
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The independent voters seems irrational because they vote for the horse they think might
win the race. In addition, the assumption that the ratio of the independent voters coincides
with the true winning probability is unrealistic. However, their voting behaviour can be un-
derstood to be similar to that of fundamental voters. Fundamental voters are rational in the
sense that they vote for the horse with the maximum expected payoff. If the win bet fraction
is smaller that the true winning probability, the expected payoff of the horse is larger than the
average expected payoff of other horses. We assume that the fundamental voters vote for the
target horse with the probability proportional to the difference between the win bet fraction
and the true winning probability. The resulting probabilistic rule is then transformed to the
rule of the independent and herding voters, as we shall show below. The independent voters
can be considered to be rational fundamental voters, if the ratio of the independent voters
who vote for the horse with the true winning probability w is equal to w.
We denote the component rates of the independent and herding voters as ri and rh,
respectively. Obviously, these rates add up to one, i.e., ri + rh = 1. Figure 4 explains the
model pictorially. Mathematically, we can express the above definition of the model using a
simple master equation. The probability Pwt that the target horse gets a vote if the horse get
n votes up to t and Xwt = n+ s is
Pwt (X
w
t = n+ s) = ri · w + rh ·
n+ s
Z + t
, (11)
Z = N r · s. (12)
The probability P (n, t + 1) of finding n votes in t + 1 voting times follows the evolution
equation
P (n, t+ 1) = (1− Pwt (n))P (n, t) + P
w
t (n− 1)P (n − 1, t). (13)
If t is sufficiently large and the win bet fraction is xwt , P
w
t is expressed as
Pwt = ri · w + rh · x
w
t . (14)
In the case of fundamental and herding voters, the probabilistic rule is expressed for a suffi-
ciently large t as
Pwt = rf · (w + λ(w − x
w
t )) + r
′
h · x
w
t . (15)
Here, we denote the component ratio of fundamental and herding voters as rf and r
′
h, respec-
tively. These voters vote for the target horse with a probability of w if xwt coincides with w. If
xwt is different from w, the probability of voting for the horse changes with λ(w−x
w
t ) where λ
is a proportional coefficient. By comparing eqs (14) and (15), the latter model can be mapped
to the former model by the relation,
ri = (1 + λ) · rf and rh = r
′
h − λrf . (16)
The voting model of independent and herding voters can be considered to be the voting model
10/14
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of rational voters.
We also assume that w obeys gamma distribution with a shape exponent a and scale
parameter c as pa,c(w).
pa,c(w) ≡
1
cΓ(a)
(
w
c
)s−1 exp(−w/c). (17)
The expected value of w is [w]w = c · a; we take this value to be 1/N
r. Here, [A]w is defined
as the average of A(w) over pa,c(w) as [A]w ≡
∫ 1
0 pa,c(w)A(w)dw. In addition, we fit the
distribution of xf with the gamma distribution pa,c(w) by the least square method and we set
the value of a = 0.47.6) The resultant AR in the model converges to ARf = 0.682. Hereafter,
we concentrate on the power law behaviours of the model, which do not depend on the detailed
nature of the distribution of w.
As has been discussed previously,7) the win bet fraction xwt converges to w after infinite
times of voting. The convergence shows the power law behaviour as
(xwt −w)
2 ∼ t−1 if ri >
1
2
(18)
(xwt − w)
2 ∼ t−2ri if ri <
1
2
(19)
(xwt − w)
2 ∼
log(t)
t
if ri =
1
2
. (20)
The power law exponent does not depend on w. After averaging (xwt −w)
2 over w with pa,c(w),
the critical behaviour remains the same. We obtain the exponent β for the convergence as
β = 0.488 and we take ri to be half of β, i.e., as ri = β/2 = 0.244. The only remaining
parameter to be set in the voting model is s the initial seeds, i.e., Xw0 = s. This parameter
describes the strength of the correlation between the votes. In the case where ri = 0, the
correlation function is calculated as 1/(Z + 1) = 1/(N rs + 1).6) If s is small, the votes are
concentrated to particular horses and the variance of the win bet fraction becomes large.
Figure 5 shows the result of the convergence of xw(t) to xf . In the figure, we show the
double logarithmic plot of [< (xw(t)− w)2 >]w vs t. We set s = 3 and 0.3. We also show the
plot of [(xα(t)− xα,f )
2] for comparison. The two former curves are straight lines with a slope
of 2ri = β. Compared to the data plot, the model’s curves show power law behaviour up to the
end. We also see a large discrepancy between the two plots and the data plot. The variance
[(xα(t)−xα,f )
2] is far larger than [< (xw(t)−w)2 >]w. By selecting a small s, we can increase
the variance of xwt and reduce the discrepancy. The votes up to the first announcement k = 1
are highly concentrated to one or two horses. AR is very small at k = 1, which can be seen by
the presence of isolated data points at t ≃ 70. The votes provide almost no information up to
the first announcement (k = 1). The effect of the misleading and concentrated votes remains
during the power law convergence period. It is only after tc that the bias begins to disappear
quickly.
11/14
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Fig. 5. Double logarithmic plot of the averaged win bet fraction [(xwt −w)
2]wvs t. From bottom, we
set s = 3 (dotted) and 0.3 (solid). The top line is the plot [(xwt − w)
2]vs t.
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Fig. 6. Double logarithmic plot of the averaged win bet fraction [(xwt −w)
2]wvs t. As in the previous
figure, we set s = 3(dotted) and 0.3(solid). The top line is the plot ARf −AR(t) vs t.
Figure 6 shows the result of the convergence of AR(t) to ARf for the same set of the values
of s. The double logarithmic plot is straight for 102 ≤ t ≤ 2× 105, and the convergence seems
to show power law behaviour. Contrary to the convergence of x(t), the slope or the critical
exponent of the convergence of AR depends on s. s = 3 is a good selection, as observed from
the comparison with the curve of data plot.
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5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the time series data of the win bet in JRA. We use the number of
votes as the time variable t of the voting process. As functions of t, the win bet fraction xα(t)
and the accuracy of predictions AR obey power laws. We obtain [(xα(t) − xα,f )
2] ∼ t−0.488
and ARf − AR(t) ∼ t
−0.589. The range where the power law holds is wider in AR(t) than in
xα(t). After tc, the convergence of the win bet fraction becomes fast. However, AR obey the
power law relation even after tc, almost up to 10
5.
We introduce a simple voting model with two types of voters–independent and herding.
The former voters provide information on the strengths of the horses in the racetrack betting
market, while latter decide on which horse to vote on the basis of the popularities of the
horses. We assume that the component ratio of the independent voters coincides with the
true winning probability of the horse that they vote for and that all the independent voters
make rational decisions. We also discuss the relationship between the model with independet
and herding voters and the model with fundamental and herding voters. We show that the
voting model can be used to explain the abovementioned power law behaviours. From the
exponent of the convergence of the win bet fraction, it is observed that the component ratio
of the independent voter to the herding voter is 1:3.
The change in the convergence after tc cannot be easily explained by increasing the com-
ponent ratio of independent voters. If this ratio is increased, the win bet fraction converges
more rapidly. However, this increase also causes the rapid convergence of AR, which con-
tradicts with the behaviour of the power law convergence of AR even after tc. After tc, the
behaviour of betters can possibly change. We believe that the power law of AR holds even
after tc because the component ratio of the voters who provide information to the market
does not change. A more detailed analysis of the time series of the betting processes must
be performed in the future. In addition, it is also important to study the time dependence of
AR. In this study, we have numerically analysed AR and showed that it increases very slowly
and seems to obey the power law relation. In contrast to the win bet fraction, the power law
dependence has not been investigated mathematically. AR is related to the area under the
ROC curve. Statistical properties of the probabilistic growth of the curve induced by voting
are an interesting problem and we believe that it should be studied.
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